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I. INTRODUCTION
THIS COMMENT addresses a series of cases that grew
out of military-related aviation accidents during World
War II. After the United States entered the Second World
War, it dramatically increased its use of the airplane as an
instrument of war.' The tactical use of the airplane re-
sulted in an increased number of aviation-related deaths,
either from United States planes being shot down or from
crashing as a result of mechanical failure.2
Survivors of deceased American pilots and crews sought
recovery as beneficiaries under the deceased's life insur-
ance policies. The insurance companies often denied re-
covery, alleging that the insurance policies did not cover
the particular cause of death. The beneficiaries of the life
insurance policies, in contrast to the insurance companies,
argued that the life insurance policies provided coverage or
that they were at least ambiguous and should be construed
in favor of the insured.3
This comment examines the litigation resulting from the
conflict between the insurance companies and the survivors
of American soldiers seeking recovery under various life in-
surance policies. Special attention is given to aviation ex-
clusions where certain risks associated with aerial flight are
risks not covered under the respective life insurance pol-
icy.4 Policy exclusions from war related risks and policies
covering war-related risks are also examined in connection
with the aviation accidents.5 The specific issue addressed is
The Japanese aerial attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, not only cre-
ated popular support for the United States entry into the war but also demonstrated
the destructive capabilities of military airplanes.
2 Roy CRoss, MILrrARY AIRcRAr: 1939-1945 (1971).
- See infra part II.B.2.
4 See infra part III.B.2.
5 See infra part III.A.
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what effect an aviation exclusion clause has on insurance
coverage in the event of an aviation accident.
The current increase in world-wide violence, political un-
rest, and the United States involvement in armed conflicts
abroad creates a contemporary need and interest in a closer
inquiry into situations which could possibly give rise to a
dispute over life insurance coverage in the aviation con-
text.6 Military and civilian planes flying to the Middle East
during the Gulf War caused insurance underwriters and in-
sureds to reexamine their aviation insurance policies."
More recently, the political struggle in Russia' and the con-
flicts in Somalia9 and the former Yugoslavia 10 will place avia-
tion insurance policies under renewed scrutiny.
In the event of a crash resulting from a war risk, the basic
questions are whether the survivors of the passengers and
crew members can recover under their respective life insur-
ance- policies, and whether the owners of the aircraft are
insured for the loss of the airplane." The existence and in-
terpretation of war risk and aviation exclusion clauses in an
insurance contract are central to answering these questions.
6 Gavin Souter & Kathryn J. McIntyre, From Cafes to Seminars, Gloom Prevails, Bus.
INS., Sept. 23, 1991, at 1.
See Denise Gellene, Pan Am Halts Nights to Tel Aviv and Riyadh, Los ANGELES
TiMs, Jan. 4, 1991, at DI. During the Persian Gulf War, Pan American Airlines can-
celed flights to the region because its insurance rates increased ten to twenty times
the normal rates; see Souter & McIntyre, supra note 6, at 1. The authors explain that
the war created confusion about war risk exclusions. "Policy holders queried
whether military actions ordered by Saddam Hussein would be excluded under the
war risk exclusion clauses if they took place outside of Iraq or Kuwait." Id.
a At the time this comment was written, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the
Russian Parliament were engaged in a struggle for control of the government. See
Yeltsin and Foes in Parliament Sign Agreement, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1993, at A6.
9 The civil war in Somalia spurred U.S. military involvement in 1993 and 1994. An
October, 1993, firefight left 18 Americans dead, 75 wounded and two helicopters
shot down. Michael R. Gordan & Thomas L. Friedman, Somali Raid Came Close to
Success, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Oct. 25, 1993, at IA.
10 The civil war in the former Yugoslavia exemplifies the volatile nature of world
politics and potential military threats. SeeJohn Kifner, Conflict in the Balkans: Truce In
Sarajevo Begins Smoothly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at Al, A4.
U This is a very basic hypothetical for purposes of introducing the topic. Issues
concerning civilian plane crashes, military plane crashes, civilian passengers, military
passengers, governmental immunity, matters of insurance policy construction, and
other relevant considerations will be developed fully in the article.
612 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
An aviation exclusion clause limits or suspends the cover-
age of an insurance policy in certain situations, resulting in
denial of beneficiary recovery. 12 The excluded risks are usu-
ally those that the underwriter feels will materially increase
the risk of loss. 3 The exclusionary clause often excludes a
war risk.14 Exclusionary language usually makes a statement
similar to the following: "This Policy does not apply ...
[u] nder Coverage A [Liability], to liability assumed by any
insured under any contract or agreement.... 15 Thus, in-
surance contracts simply do not cover certain excluded
risks. 16 Insurance companies use these exclusions to ensure
that the aviation policy covers what is meant to be insured
and limits the liability of the insurer for those events that
are not meant to be included in the coverage. 7
This comment is organized into three parts. The first
section gives an historical perspective of aviation and avia-
tion insurance with a discussion of modern developments.
It discusses the rise of aviation as a mode of transportation
and the corresponding growth of aviation insurance. The
second section explains war risk and aviation exclusions
and their application in the context of case law interpreta-
tions. The current status of war risk aviation insurance ex-
clusions and some of the controversies pertaining to them
are analyzed. Cases involving life insurance policies as well
as cases involving property insurance demonstrate the ap-
plication and controversy of insurance exclusions. Matters
concerning war risk insurance exclusions that are yet to be
resolved will also be identified.
The final section includes analysis and public policy con-
siderations. Answers to the confusion surrounding war risk
12 Martha McGhee-Glisson, Flying Blind: The Medical Certificate Warranty and General
Aviation Insurance Exclusions, 5 AIR L. 211, 211 (1980).
13 Id.
14 10 GEORGEJ. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 41:55 (2d ed. 1987).
15 John H. Ballard & Thomas H. Chero, Analysis of Aviation Liability Coverage Exclu-
sions, 45J. AIR L. & COM. 117, 118 (1979) (citing AvemCo Insurance Co. Policy Form
Series AVP (7-71), Exclusions § (a)).
16 Kathleen E. Shannon, Rulings on War-Risk Exclusions, A Major Concern of Insurers,
N.Y. LJ., Aug. 24, 1984, at 1.
17 Id.
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and aviation exclusions and possible future developments
are considered. The federal government's response to the
problem of war risk insurance via the Federal Aviation War
Risk Insurance Program is included in this discussion.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. EARLY AVIATION AND AVIATION INSURANCE
On December 17, 1903, at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina,
Orville Wright made the first controlled flight of a powered
aircraft. 8 The Wright brothers' aerial achievements began
the most significant era in transportation history.' 9 In a
short period, the United States developed a large and com-
plex airline industry that completely changed travel and
transportation.20
The United States Post Office sparked the beginning of
the American airline industry.2' But these early flight
attempts-around 1911-1912-faced problems of poor
weather, undependable planes, and limited use of planes at
night.2 2 These problems were solved through the assistance
of military pilots, planes and technology.23 With this help,
regularly scheduled airmail services began in the United
States around 1918.24 By 1924, the post office achieved
twenty-four hour air mail schedules, and the airplane se-
cured its place in the new age of transportation. 5
The commercialization of the airline industry was largely
the result of the Airmail Act of 1925 which encouraged the
commercial operation of airmail transportation.2 6 In a mat-
's ROBERT M. KANE & ALtAN D. VOSE, AIR TRANSPORTATION 1-1 (6th ed. 1977).
19 Id.
-0 Id. at 1-2.
21 NAWAL K. TANEJA, THE COMMERCiAL AIRUNE INDUSTRY 1 (6th prtg. 1981).
2 V. FoST Rouo, AvATION LAw: AN INTRODUCTION 53 (2d ed. 1982). The early
airmail flights were regarded as little more than stunts. Id. (citing Kane & Vose,
supra note 18, § 5).
23 Id.
24 Id. After the first year of airmail delivery, the United States Post Office reported
over $20,000 in profits.
Id. Flying at night became common as the Department of Commerce assisted in
the development of radios, aircraft, and better airport facilities. Id. at 53-54.
TANEJA, supra note 21, at 1.
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ter of a few years, the government had turned over the task
of transporting the mail to the commercial sector.
The United States soon realized that the commercial air-
lines needed better communication and safety regulation.28
Congress responded to safety concerns and industry needs
by passing the Air Commerce Act of 1926. The Act author-
ized the Secretary of Commerce to establish the Aeronau-
tics Branch, which became the Bureau of Air Commerce.
The Bureau, which was charged with writing and enforcing
safety regulations, 29 began the age of governmental airline
regulation. 0
The Air Commerce Act of 1926, while showing a commit-
ment to the growth of commercial aviation, firmly estab-
lished the government's role in this industry. The safety
regulations required by the Act demonstrated the increased
governmental role.3 ' The early regulations called for the re-
gistration of airplanes, the licensing of pilots and planes,
medical certification for pilots, and civil penalties for viola-
tions.3 2 The airline industry, therefore, matured and grew
out of early governmental involvement.33 Growth in the in-
surance industry corresponded to increased air travel to
meet the needs of the expanding insurance market.3 4
Surprisingly, insurers wrote the first aviation insurance
policy only a few years after the 1903 flight by the Wright
Brothers.3 5 The Lloyd's Insurance Company of London ac-
cepted its first aviation insurance policy before the end of
1910.36 The Lloyd's policy, only covered legal liability be-
27 Id.
28 ROLLO, supra note 22, at 54.
2 Id. at 54. The Aeronautics Branch was later called the Bureau of Air Commerce
after a reorganization in 1934 and it ultimately evolved into the current Federal
Aviation Administration. Id.
0 Id.
31 KANE & VOSE, supra note 18, at 5-5.
32 Id.
33 Id.
3 ALEKSANDER ToBoLEwsKI, MONETARY LIMITATIONS OF LIABILrrY IN AIR LAW 110-
11 (1986).
3 VERA FOSTER.RoLLo, AVIATION INSURANCE 6 (1987).
6 RAYMOND FLOWER & MICHAEL W. JONES, LLOYD'S OF LONDON: AIR ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY 138 (1974). In 1911, Lloyd's wrote their first standardized insurance policy
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cause the airplanes of that era had not developed to the
point of being reliable and predictable. 7
After World War I, the rise of the United States air mail
service was accompanied by the need for aviation insur-
ance. The risks, however, remained too high for expansive
growth in the industry."8
As a result of the high risks, insurance companies only
started to experiment with aviation insurance policies dur-
ing 1917-1927.3 9 A number of United States insurance com-
panies wrote aviation policies at the close of World War 1.40
The Travelers Insurance Company entered the enterprise
of aviation insurance and outlasted the competition.41 Be-
sides Travelers, no other United States insurance company
maintained aviation insurance coverage after these early at-
tempts.4 Travelers provided life insurance, public liability,
and accidental injury coverages for aviation-related activ-
ity.43 World War II sparked the modern age of aviation in-
surance and pushed the industry out of its formative
beginning. 4
B. MODERN AVIATION AND AVIATION INSURANCE
The commercial aviation industry hit a boom after World
War 11. 4 - Aircraft manufacturers gained enormous experi-
for aviation. Id. at 142. This source also provides an excellent historical background
of the English insurance giant.
37 ROLLO, AVIATION INSURANCE, supra note 35, at 6.
Id. Specifically stating that,
Harking back to basic insurance premises, we can see why. There
were comparatively few aircraft so premiums could scarcely be set high
enough to cover claims and still be affordable. Claims were probable,
since aircraft and the art of flying were still in the developmental
stages. Predicting losses was almost impossible in such a new field,
because no data had been accumulated over time.
Id.
, Id. at 7.
0 C. 0. Miller, Aviation Accident Insurance in the Context of Contract Law, TRIAL, Mar.
1979, at 47, 48.
41 Id. at 48.
42 Id.
43 RoLLo, AVIATION INSURANCE, supra note 35, at 7.
44 SruART M. SPEISER ET AL., AVIATION TORT LAW § 22:2 (1980).
- Id.
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ence in building airplanes for the war effort and military
pilots and mechanics provided an abundance of technical
knowledge after the war.46 Military surplus airplanes and
an almost endless supply of inexpensive parts and cheap
fuel, set the stage for the birth of the modern airline
industry.4 7
The new technology and experience enabled planes to
be flown safely at night.48 New transport planes flew farther
and faster and had a much higher payload capacity.49
Planes flew routes safely and routinely across the Pacific
and Atlantic oceans.5 ° By 1955, the United States airline in-
dustry matured.5 1 The establishment of the airline industry
brought with it an increased amount of governmental regu-
lation and a corresponding growth of aviation insurance
underwriters.
The growth of the airline industry and need for insur-
ance met with a period of confusion after World War 11.52
The aviation insurance market overexpanded and compa-
nies dropped out of the market.5 3 As insurance companies
gained experience in this new field, relevant information
became available and the companies adjusted premiums to
adequately reflect risks. 4 By 1948, the insurance industry
had adequately adjusted to the market risks. 5 The settling
down of the insurance industry corresponded to the gov-
ernmental regulation of the airline industry.
4 Id.
4 Id.
48 ROLLO, AVIATION INSURANCE, supra note 35, at 7. "Better instruments and ra-
dios; the use of radar the establishment of new high-frequency, omni-directional,
radio ranges-all helped make most bad-weather flying more practical." Id.
49 TANEJA, supra note 21, at 7.
- ROLLO, AvtATION INSURANCE, supra note 35, at 7.
51 TANEJA, supra note 21, at 10.
52 ROLLO, AViATION INSURANCE, supra note 35, at 8.
53 Id.
5 Id.
.5 Id. The Insurance Corporation of North America and American Mercury Insur-
ance Company were among the independent aviation insurers forging the way in the
growing industry. Id.
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In 1938, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act.56
This act either amended or repealed all significant prior
legislation relating to aviation regulation.5 7 The Civil Aero-
nautics Act organized three agencies to oversee economic
and safety regulation of the airline industry.5" This Act sub-
jected the commercial airlines to standard governmental
safety regulations.5 9
The growth of the airline industry and air travel after
World War II caused complex safety and logistical
problems.6° A series of airplane collisions that occurred in
mid-air prompted Congress to take action.61 Congress
passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to handle these
problems.62 The new law made it easier for the Federal Avi-
ation Agency to suspend licensing certificates and gave the
agency clear authority to divide and allocate the airspace
and travel schedules between civilian and military aircraft.63
The involvement of the Federal Aviation Agency grew, and
its Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) became more
complex.6 4
The insurance companies used these aviation regulations
as bench marks when writing aviation policies.65 That is,
early insurance policies contained exclusions for FAR viola-
- KANE & VosE, supra note 18, at 5-15.
57 Id,
5 Id. The Civil Aeronautics Authority consisted of a five-member board whose
responsibility was to formulate aviation regulations. The second body included the
Administrator of Aviation whose responsibilities included enforcing the Civil Aero-
nautic Authority's regulations. The last agency was the Air Safety Board, consisting
of three members, whose responsibility was to conduct investigations of aircraft acci-
dents. Id.
TANEJA, supra note 21, at 5.
6 Id, at 11. A series of three serious airplane accidents occurred between 1956
and 1958. See id.
61 KANE & VOSE, supra note 18, at 6-2.
62 TANEJA, supra note 21, at 11. The new act amended and repealed the provisions
in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, but the basic system of regulatory authority
remained the same. Id
3 KANE & VosE, supra note 18, at 6-3.
64 McGhee-Glisson, supra note 12, at 212. The FARs prohibited about every possi-
ble danger or harmful activity imaginable, "from using portable electronic devices to
operat[ing] an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner." Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9,
91.10, 91.19 (1973)).
6 RoLo, AvIATION INSUANCE, sup-a note 35, at 71.
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tions which meant that the policy did not cover many FAR
regulations.66 The insured airline industry realized that few
aviation accidents occurred without a violation of one of
the Federal Aviation Regulations. 6 Insurance companies
claimed that virtually every aviation accident violated FAR
regulations and refused to cover those risks.6 a Courts and
state legislatures reacted by rejecting claims that any viola-
tion of the FARs would be grounds to deny coverage.6 9
Today, quality aviation insurance policies do not have the
sweeping FAR exclusions.70 The insurance industry adapted
to meet the shape and needs of the airline industry in con-
junction with the role of the courts. Today, the United
States private insurance industry is the largest and most or-
ganized insurance market in the world. 7 1 The modern air-
line industry effected the nature of this dynamic industry.
Aviation today can generally be divided into three catego-
ries: (1) military, (2) commercial, and (3) general.72 Mili-
tary aviation includes tactical airplanes such as fighters,
bombers, intelligence aircraft, helicopters, cargo planes,
troop transport airplanes, and a variety of others.73 The
commercial airline category includes everything from small
aircraft to jumbo jets. 74 Finally, general aviation is the broad
- Id. The Federal Aviation Regulations have always been extremely complex.
FARs give "detailed statutory prohibitions against every potential harmful activity on
board from using portable electronics devices to 'operating an aircraft in a careless
or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another .... .' " McGhee-
Glisson, supra note 12, at 212 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9, 91.10, 91.19 (1973)).
67 McGhee-Glisson, supra note 12, at 212.
68 Id.
a Id.; see also Roach v. Churchman, 431 F.2d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding
that denying coverage for any FAR causes "the insuring agreements [to] become
illusory in effect since few accidents occur without the aircraft's owner or pilot violat-
ing one or more of the very detailed regulations promulgated by the Federal Avia-
tion Administration").
70 RoLLo, AvIATION INSURANCE, supra note 35, at 71.
71 Id. at 15. The United States is home to almost 2,000 insurance companies that
offer life and health insurance and close to 3,000 companies that offer property and
liability insurance. The combined assets of these firms is over $733 billion. Id.
n Id. at 27.
" Id. As of 1986 there were over 19,000 airplanes being used by the United States
government. Id.
74 Id. Close to 4,370 airplanes made up the commercial airline fleet in 1984.
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category that includes everything else.7 Hence, there are a
lot of airplanes in the air and a correspondingly high
number of aviation accidents. 76
The modern insurance industry responded to the need
to insure against these risks. Insurance companies sell three
basic types of aviation insurance: (1) aircraft liability, (2)
hull insurance, and (3) accident insurance. 77 Aircraft liabil-
ity insurance covers damages caused in connection with the
use and operation of the aircraft.78 Hull insurance protects
the aircraft owner's interests with coverage for damage or
loss to the plane and cargo.79 Accident insurance is the last
category, and it is a sweeping coverage that provides insur-
ance coverage resulting from tort claims that arise out of an
aircraft accident.80
These types of coverage come to life in the modern avia-
tion insurance policy. Insurance companies divide the basic
aviation insurance contract into five key parts: (1) declara-
tions, (2) definitions, (3) insurance agreements, (4) exclu-
sions, and (5) conditions.8 1 The declaration page basically
describes the type of coverage, the amount of coverage, the
person or company being insured, the time periods of cov-
erage, and various warranty and purpose clauses.8 2
The definitions section of the aviation insurance contract
explains essential terms of the policy for purposes of clarifi-
75 RoLLo, AVIATION INSURANCE, supra note 35, at 15. Some examples of aircraft in
this category are private business aircraft, personal aircraft, rental and commuter
operations, instructional and sport flying, and special purpose aircraft used for such
things as police work and crop dusting. Id.
76 SPEISER, supra note 44, § 22:2 at 5-6. "Annually, U.S. general aviation suffers
approximately 4300 major accidents in which about one-quarter of the aircraft are
destroyed and the remaining are damaged substantially. In recent years, these acci-
dents produced about 1400 fatalities." Id.
7 Miller, supra note 40, at 48.
78 Id.
7 Rotuo, AVIATION INSURANCE, supra note 35, at 48.
8 Miller, supra note 40, at 48. Life and health insurance will also be included
under this category as insurance claims and disputes for casualties relating to an
aviation accident are to be expected. See Rou.o, AvIATION INSURANCE, supra note 35,
at 48.
8' SPEISER, supra note 44, § 23:1.
82 Id. § 23.2.
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cation. 83 The insurance agreements section is important be-
cause it identifies the types of coverage that are available
under the policy.84 "Passenger bodily injury" and "property
damage" are examples of coverage.85 The conditions sec-
tion explains those "event[s], not certain to occur, which
must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before
performance under a contract becomes due."8 6
Before discussing aviation exclusions in detail, the differ-
ences between exclusions, conditions, warranties, and rep-
resentations needs explaining.87 Conditions usually fall into
two categories: (1) conditions precedent and (2) condi-
tions subsequent.8 8 Conditions precedent, require the oc-
currence or performance of some event, after the terms of
the contract have been agreed upon but before the con-
tract takes effect, and before a duty is created.8 9 Conditions
subsequent terminate the operation of a contract with the
happening of some event or failure of some required act.90
A representation is a statement by the insurer to the in-
sured explaining what risks the insurance contract covers
and those it does not.91 A representation is made before
83 Id. § 23.3. Things such as "aircraft," "in flight," "taxying," "insured," and other
terms the insurer feels necessary to contractually define are included in this section.
Speiser notes that the use of a definitions section does not completely distinguish
controversy over the meaning of words in the contract. Id.
84 Id.
85 SPEISER, supra note 44, § 23:4.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981).
87 The importance of these distinctions exists because the classification may effect
whether an aviation accident is included or excluded from the insurance coverage.
43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1011 (1982).
Clarance E. Hagglund & Lindsay G. Arthur, Jr., Coverage Problems in Aviation
Insurance Policies, 23 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 4, 8 (1973) [hereinafter Hagglund &
Arthur].
- Id.
- Conditions are different from exclusions:
These types of conditions are distinguishable from exclusions in two
significant regards: (1) conditions are concerned with exceptions to
coverage and exclusions limit the contractual duties and obligations of
the insurer, and (2) the burden of proof with respect to conditions
precedent is on the insured, and the burden with respect to exclusions
is on the insurer.
Id.
91 SPEISER, supra note 44, § 26:4.
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the parties enter into a contractual agreement and the rep-
resentation is technically not part of the contract.9 2 A rep-
resentation voids the contract if it materially relates to the
dispute and was made wilfully and knowingly to defraud the
insured. 3
A warranty is a promise by the insured that appears in the
contract and relates to the risks it insures against.94 A
breach of warranty, whether it is material or insignificant,
will void an insurance contract completely.9 5 Significantly,
a breach of a warranty prevents recovery by the insured
even if the breach is not material to the cause giving rise to
the dispute. This is different from representations that
only call for substantial compliance. 7
The distinction between exclusions when compared to
conditions, warranties, and representations often effects the
outcome of a case. Commentators suggest, however, that
modern courts may focus less on these technical differ-
ences.9 8 In any case, a familiarity with these terms provides a
gateway to understand the implications of aviation insur-
ance exclusions.
The exclusions section of an aviation contract allows the
insurer to explicitly set forth those risks which are not part
of the contract.9 Central to this understanding is the no-
tion that there is no insurance for an excluded risk and that
there never was.10 A familiarity with the basic types of cov-
erage and elements of an aviation insurance policy assists
when attempting to fully understand war risk and aviation
insurance exclusion clauses.
92 Id.
-' Hagglund & Arthur, supra note 88, at 10.
N SPEISER, supra note 44, § 26:9.
- Hagglund & Arthur, supra note 88, at 10.
- SPEISER, supra note 44, § 26:9. A state statute, however, may provide less severe
results for breach of warranty. I&. § 26:10.
9 Hagglund & Arthur, supra note 88, at 10.
9 Id. at 12.
- Ballard & Chero, supra note 15, at 118.
100 Id. at 119 (citing 63 A.L.R. 2D 1114, 1123 (1959)).
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III. WAR RISK AND AVIATION INSURANCE
EXCLUSIONS
A. DISCUSSION OF WAR RISK EXCLUSIONS
War risk exclusions have a long history in the United
States. The United States insurance industry entered into
the War and Civil War Risks Agreement in 1937.101 The in-
dustry entered the agreement because it suffered extreme
financial losses during the Spanish Civil War.'02 The agree-
ment provided that "exclusive of the United States and Can-
ada, no underwriter will insure against damages due to war,
including civil war." 03
The insurers accepted standard war risk exclusionary lan-
guage drafted by the Fire Offices Committee (FOR). 104
This agreement is the grandfather of modern aviation war
risk exclusions.10 5  Today, insurance companies consider
aviation and war risk exclusion clauses particularly impor-
tant because of the growth of the aviation and aviation
risks. 106
Although the number of aviation insurance policies that
insurers are writing is increasing, liability is being limited by
using aviation exclusions.10 7 Exclusionary clauses often re-
sult in litigation when a policy holder is denied coverage. 08
When a policy holder sustains a loss from an aviation acci-




-o8 Id. The standard war risk aviation exclusion clause is probably similar to the
following:
THIS POLICY DOES NOT APPLY.
(10) To loss or damage or any liability of the Insured directly or indi-
rectly occasioned by, happening through or in consequence of mili-
tary, naval or usurped power whether in time of peace or war and
whether lawful or unlawful, war, invasion, civil war, revolution, rebel-
lion, insurrection or warlike operation, whether there be a declaration
of war or not.
SPEISER, supra note 44, § 23:5 (Exclusion of Lloyd's Aircraft Hull Policy (USA)).




dent, the question becomes: "What was excluded and what
is the meaning of this exclusion?"10 9
Courts recognize the legality of war risk exclusion clauses
as well as the insurer's right to limit its liability. 110 Neither
public policy nor matters of questionable patriotism affect
the validity of such exclusions. 11 Thus, the dispute between
the insured and insurer usually centers around the mean-
ing of the exclusion.1 1 2 The outcome of disputes involving
war risk aviation exclusions is often critical, especially if the
dispute relates to the life insurance policy of a person in the
armed services killed in the line of duty. The reason is that
the Federal Tort Claims Act'1 5 does not provide a remedy
for military personnel injured or killed during the course of
their employment.- 4
Active duty soldiers precluded from recovering under the
Federal Tort Claims Act are similarly precluded from recov-
ering under the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees
act of 1964.115 If the insured is not covered by his life insur-
1 See P. W. Engstrom, Alternative Wordings to the Present General Aviation Insurance
Policies, 43J. AIR L. & COM. 357, 359 (1977).
110 Sidney I. Simon, The Dilemma of War and Military Exclusion Clauses in Insurance
Contracts, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 31, 34 (1981); see also, 10 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 41:551 (2d ed. 1987). In Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., the court held:
[the] purpose of such a [war risk exclusion] clause is not insidious or
difficult to understand. Military or naval service in time of war,
whether in training or combat, is admittedly hazardous, and fraught
with incalculable danger. It is difficult to determine the scope of risks
assumed by members of the armed forces in view of the methods of
warfare, keeping in mind the possible devastation of present and fu-
ture developments.
98 A.2d 134, 139 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1953).
1I Simon, supra note 110, at 34.
112 Id.
I's See WINDLE TuRLEY, AvIATION LmGATION § 2.29 (1986) [hereinafter Turley].
The author explains that suits arising out of negligence against the government will
be subject to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
114 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950) (placing importance on the
federal nature of the relationship between soldiers and the government); see TURLEY,
supra note 113, at 108 (explaining that Feres was expanded to preclude third-party
actions against the United States in Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp., v. United States, 431
U.S. 666 (1977), thus creating what is commonly know as the Feres-Stencel
Doctrine).
115 TURLEY, supra note 113, § 2.29 (citing Towry v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 101
(E.D. La. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 620 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
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ance policy, federal legislation severely limits his opportuni-
ties for compensation.' 6 Thus, the war risk and aviation
exclusions become increasingly important.
Courts are often called on to interpret various terms in
aviation insurance policies that contain war risk exclu-
sions.1 1 7 The terms that courts repeatedly analyze are: (1)
military or usurped power,1 8 (2) riot,119 (3) warlike opera-
tions,120 (4) insurrection, 21 (5) civil commotion,122 and (6)
war.12 3 One of the first problems a court may face is deter-
mining whether any of the above type terms, which were
set forth in the contract, existed at the time of the alleged
injury.124
The courts adopted two doctrines to determine if the
word war in the insurance policy applies to the violence giv-
1078 (1981)). Turley recognizes that service members do have limited recovery op-
portunities under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193
(1989). TuRLE', supra note 113, § 2.29.
116 Id.
1 Ralph Vinciguerra, Note, Insurance, War Risk Exclusion Clause Does Not Bar Recov-
eyy Under an All Risk Policy for Damages Resulting from Terrorist Activities, 8 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 923, 924 (1975).
118 Military or usurped power has been defined as that "power exerted by an in-
vading foreign enemy, or by an internal armed force in rebellion, sufficient to sup-
plant the laws of the land and displace the constituted authorities." Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 127 (1877).
11 Vinciguerra, supra note 117, at 928 (explaining that the word riot has not
clearly been defined for insurance purposes). One court defined riot as the gather-
ing of "three or more persons" with the "common purpose" to do "an unlawful act
[with the intention to use] force or violence," Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Rosenberg,
25 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1928). Another court defined riot as requiring a "tumult"
or "disturbance" at the time of the action. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. War Eagle Coal
Co., 295 F. 663, 665 (4th Cir. 1924).
'2 Warlike operations are normally part of an armed conflict between combatants
and may not include intentional violence against civilians by political groups.
Vinciguerra, supra note 117, at 926-27.
12, An insurrection has been defined as "[a] rebellion, or rising of citizens or sub-
jects in resistance to their government," BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 808 (6th ed.
1990); see Vinciguerra, supra note 117, at 927.
I2 A civil commotion has been defined as a local domestic disturbance that is
confined to the immediate area of its occurrence. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. War
Eagle Coal Co., 295 F. 663 (4th Cir. 1924).
123 Vinciguerra, supra note 117, at 925.
124 James M. Crain, Comment, War Exclusion Clauses and Undeclared Wars, 39 TENN.
L. Rxv. 328, 331 (1972).
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ing rise to the insured's claim. 125 The first is the "technical
meaning" doctrine which explains that war means war in
the legal sense and must be declared.1 26 The second is the
"common meaning" doctrine. 27 The common meaning
doctrine requires that words used in an insurance policy are
construed in their plain, ordinary, common and popular
sense.128 The only exception is when it is apparent from the
face, scope, and purpose of the contract, that the words
were to have some other special meaning. 29
Many life insurance policies today usually do not exclude
death from war risks or war related activity.13 0 Most life in-
surance policies, however, limit the amount of recovery for
an insured who dies in a war related activity.'' Therefore,
whether the insured's death results from a war related activ-
ity is usually not at issue for recovering the face value of the
insurance contract.13 2 The controversy arises under the
double indemnity provisions of an insurance contract. 3 3
The policies with double indemnity provisions usually
employ war risk exclusion clauses that prevent double re-
covery where the insured dies as a result of war.' 34 The is-
sue in controversy, therefore, is often whether the insurer
must pay the double recovery or just the face value of the
policy.' 35 The answer to this question typically depends on
the judicial construction and interpretation of the exclu-
sion clause. 136
- Id. at 332.
'- Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa.), cet. denied, 346
U.S. 820 (1953).
127 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 811 (1947).
128 Id.
129 Id.
'so Simon, supra note 110, at 33.
is, Id. at 34.
13 Id.
- Id. A large number of life insurance policies provide for recovery of twice the
amount of the face value of the policy if the insured dies accidentally. Id. at 33-34.
This is known as double indemnity.
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General principles of contract law relating to construc-
tion influence and determine the outcome.""7 The rule of
adhesion in insurance law probably affects how a court in-
terprets the operation of the policy.'38 Generally, this rule
means that courts construe ambiguities against the insurer
and in favor of the insured. 39 Judges, however, interpret
clear terms in their ordinary sense unless they have a
changed technical meaning. 1
40
Thus, because courts avoid rewriting contracts for the
parties, they usually enforce the war risk exclusion if it is
drafted correctly.' 4' In each case the court must not only
decide whether the language is clear but also what the
meaning and intent of the contracting parties was from the
four corners of the insurance contract. 42
Aviation exclusion clauses are normally categorized as
either result or status clauses.' 43 Result clauses exclude cov-
erage for death that results from military related activity
during war. 144 Status clauses exclude recovery for death
while the insured is in military service in a time of war solely
because of the insured's status as a member of the
military. 14
5
The difference between how the court classifies a war risk
exclusion clause may be critical to the outcome of the case.
Precise wording used in a result clause may exclude the avi-
ation risk and absolve the insurer from liability.1 46 The in-
surer is absolved from liability when the insured is
,37 Hagglund & Arthur, supra note 88, at 6.
'8 Simon, supra note 110, at 34.
,' SPEISER, supra note 44, § 25:7.
140 J.A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Who is "Fare-Paying Passenger" within Coverage Provi-
sion of Life or Accident Insurance Policy, 60 A.L.R. 3d 1273, 1276 (1974).
11, Simon, supra note 110, at 34.
,42 Id. at 34-35.
,11 Id. at 35.
144 Id.
143 Id.
,46 Simon, supra note 110, at 35 (citing Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., 255 S.W.
106 (Mo. 1920)) (construing a clause excluding coverage for "death while engaged
in military or naval service in time of war" to allow recovery of survivor of insured
where insured died of pneumonia. The court held that the clause was a result clause
and the insured's death did not result from his military service.).
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employed in military service, or, more generally, when the
insured dies as a result of war. 4 7 The outcome is the same
whether or not the insured actually served in the military as
a combatant or otherwise. 148 If a consumer, therefore,
purchased a life insurance policy containing a result clause
war risk exclusion and subsequently died as a civilian casu-
alty of war, the insurance company could deny her recov-
ery. 49 The issue courts decide, therefore, is whether the
exclusion is a result clause or a status clause.
The recovery outcome of status clauses usually depends
on two issues: (1) the military status of the insured, and (2)
the courts interpretation of whether the hostility is within
the policy's meaning of war.'5 ' If the policy uses a clause
which excludes coverage simply because of the insured's
status as a member of the armed services, his recovery may
be denied even if his death is not related to a hostile or
warlike action.15 1 Case decisions revolving around status
clauses often turn on the question of whether a person
served in the military at the time of the accident or whether
the person died as a civilian. 152
The following case law analysis examines situations where
there was conflicting authority as to the result of a war risk
aviation exclusion clause. Since many of these cases arose
out of the use of aviation in World War II, 1 - the Korean
War, and Vietnam, the perspective of the following analysis
is somewhat historical. The analysis used in the cases, how-
ever, will be useful in a current context because this is an
area where no clear guidelines exist.
141 Simon, supra note 110, at 35.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 38; see supra notes 118-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
meaning of war.
1 ' Simon, supra note 110, at 38. In Saladino v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 68
N.Y.S.2d 35, 37-39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946), appeal dism'd, 70 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1947) the court denied double indemnity recovery under a policy that excluded
double recovery while insured was a "member of the military, naval or air forces of
any country at war," where the insured was a member of the armed services and died
in an automobile accident during World War II.
152 Simon, supra note 110, at 39.
1-3 See COUCH, supra note 14, § 41:555.
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B. CASE LAw PROBLEMS IN INTERPRETING INSURANCE
EXCLUSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR OR
MILITARY AVIATION-RELATED AcTvTY
1. Background
Most of the controversy surrounding aviation exclusion
clauses and war risk exclusions relates to life insurance pol-
icy coverage and the beneficiary's attempt to recover under
the policy.'54 Categorizing aviation casualty cases is a tenu-
ous endeavor. No two cases arise out of a similar fact scena-
rio. Although the cases appear to be largely decided on
their facts, a few generalizations can be made. First, a ma-
jority of the cases arise out of conflicting clauses within the
insured's insurance policy. Second, most of the other cases
turn on an interpretation of a specific insurance policy
clause. Finally, a separate class of cases exist for an aircraft
owner's claims arising out of losses to her aircraft or cargo.
The cases in this section demonstrate the early struggle that
courts had in interpreting insurance policies in the context
of aviation casualties resulting from military or wartime
activity.
2. Aviation Exclusions in the Absence of a War Risk Exclusion
The following cases are situations where an insured's life
insurance policy contained an aviation exclusion but did
not contain a war risk exclusion. For purposes of categori-
zation it is helpful to separate the cases based on the in-
sured's apparent cause of death. In some situations the
insured died as a result of hostile enemy activity. In other
situations the insured died as a result of accidents arising
out of tactical maneuvers or training exercises. Finally, a
few cases arose out of severe weather or mechanical mal-
functions in the plane.
154 Id.
WAR RISK EXCLUSIONS
a. Crashes Resulting From Hostile Enemy Activity
Paradies v. Travelers Insurance Co.'55 is typical of the con-
troversy that developed when courts attempted to under-
stand the operation of an aviation exclusion in the absence
of a war risk exclusion. In Paradies the insured, Paradies,
purchased a life insurance policy that excluded aviation re-
lated risks'56 but did not exclude war risks. Paradies died
while performing his duties on a military aircraft in a com-
bat mission.
The New York city court held that the aviation exclusion
was not a bar to recovery because, according to the court,
the exclusion related to civilian flying, not military avia-
tion.15 7 The court reasoned that if the insurer wished to ex-
clude war risks it could have done so, and had Paradies died
"in a foxhole, on a landing beach, or lost at sea" the insur-
ance company would have undoubtedly paid.15 8 The source
of the court's confidence is questionable because only two
years after Paradies a New York appellate court held for the
insurer in a similar case.'5 9
The facts and issues of Boye v. United Services Life Insurance
Co.160 are similar to Paradies. The insured, Boye, purchased
a life policy that specifically excluded aviation risks but did
not have a war risk exclusion clause. Boye died while per-
forming duties as a crew member on an plane flying a mis-
sion during World War II. His plane never returned. The
court held that since Boye died on a military mission and
probably from enemy fire, "it resulted from a risk of war
that the policy did not exclude and not from a risk of avia-
tion that the policy did exclude."' 6'
' 52 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. City Ct. 1944).
The policy stated, "[d]eath as a result, directly or indirectly, of service, travel or
flight in any species of aircraft, except as a passenger on a licensed passenger aircraft
... is a risk not assumed under this contract." Id. at 291.
15 Id. at 291.
-m Id. at 292.
' See Durland v. New York Life Ins. Co., 61 N.Y.S.2d 700 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946).
168 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 828 (1948).
161 Id. at 571. The court explained that if Boye's policy had excluded death due to
riding in an automobile and he had been gunned down in the car it is obvious his
death was not related to the auto exclusion. Id,
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Paradies and Boye are important to understanding the
early controversy surrounding the judicial interpretations
of aviation insurance exclusions. The cases reveal that the
courts appeared to favor the insured in situations where the
death resulted from hostile enemy activity even where the
death occurred in an apparently uninsured aviation related
event. The courts, however, had a more difficult time wres-
tling with accidents that did not directly relate to hostile
enemy fire.
b. Crashes Resulting From Tactical Maneuvers and
Training
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided
United Services Life Insurance Co. v. Bischoff 62 in apparent op-
position to its Boye' 63 decision. In Bischoff the insured
crashed when the wing of his plane brushed against a train
as he maneuvered away after an attempted attack.1 64 Bisch-
off's insurance policy contained an exclusion for aviation
risks but had no war risk exclusion. The aviation exclusion
limited recovery to premiums paid if death related to "oper-
ating or riding in any kind of aircraft....'a65 Interestingly,
the court held, "[r]isks of war are not excepted from this
general aviation exclusion clause. Since the exclusion is un-
qualified it applied equally to all risks, whether of war or of
peace, that result from operating or riding in airplanes."' 66
Additionally, in Bischoff the court found it immaterial that
the policy specifically stated that it contained no restrictions
for military service. 167 The court found that this clause
meant that the policy did not exclude all war risks, however,
1-2 181 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
163 Boye, 168 F.2d at 570.
16 Bischoff was flying close to the ground to attack a locomotive with machine
gun fire. The wing of his plane came in contact with the train as he banked away and





it did not mean that the insurance policy covered all war
risks. 168
The court's decision in this case is hard to explain in
light of its decision in Boye'69 because the insurance cover-
age was essentially the same in both cases. The court even
cited Boye but only said that the policies were similar in that
both included aviation exclusion clauses.170 The court
made no attempt to distinguish the cases, and issued its
holding in a brief one-page opinion. A possible explanation
for the differing holdings is that Bischoff's crash was an un-
insured aviation risk and not a war risk because his death
related to his control of the plane, not enemy fire. Bischoff
and Boye demonstrate the lack ofjudicial guidance and pre-
dictability in determining how the courts will interpret avia-
tion exclusion clauses.
Trahan v. Southland Life Insurance Co.171 is a case arising
out of the death of an insured during a training mission. In
Trahan the insured served as a pilot in the air force. Trahan
bought a life insurance policy and explicitly told the insur-
ance agent that he did not want a life insurance policy that
excluded aviation risks. When the agent delivered the pol-
icy, Trahan rejected it because it contained two aviation rid-
ers; one was a "War and Aviation Risk" rider while the
company labeled the other rider a "Partial Exclusion of Avi-
ation Risk."
The insurance agent subsequently returned a different
policy along with a written statement that he had removed
the "War and Aviation Risk" rider. The "Partial Exclusion of
Aviation Risk" rider, however, had not been removed. Tra-
han relied on the written statement and the agent's assur-
ance that the written statement "takes care of the flying
coverage" and accepted the policy without reading it.
Trahan fell to his death from an airplane a few months
later while engaged in a training flight over the Gulf of
1 Boye, 168 F.2d at 570.
170 Bischoff, 181 F.2d at 628.
17, 289 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. 1956).
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Mexico. The insurer denied coverage because Trahan's
death was related to the flight. This was an excluded risk
under the "Partial Exclusion, of Aviation Risk" rider which
had not been removed from the policy. 172
The court held for the insured reasoning that the policy
contained ambiguous terms.' 73 The court found the policy
ambiguous because "[t]he fact that the company would
place two practically identical riders on the same policy
within itself raises a question as to its intention. " 174 The
court relied on the fact that the insurance company labeled
one exclusion "War and Aviation Risk Exclusion Rider,"
and titled the other "Partial Exclusion of Aviation Risk."' 75
The court found that a reasonable explanation of the dif-
ferent labels meant that one exclusion applied to military
aviation and the other exclusion related to civilian avia-
tion.176 The rider which the insurance agent removed from
the policy mentioned war, and the rider which remained in
force did not. Finally, the court noted that the label of "Par-
tial Exclusion" supported the, holding that it only partially
excluded aviation risks, and the part excluded was civilian
aviation, not military aviation. 77
The court's analysis is interesting because the "Partial Ex-
clusion of Aviation Risk" indicated that the policy excluded
from coverage any death resulting from an insured's in-
volvement as a crew member on an aircraft.17 Trahan
served as a member of the aviation crew when he died and
172 The rider excluded coverage for death relating directly or indirectly to aviation
or flight "[i]f at any time, the Insured is a pilot, officer, or member of a crew of any
aircraft ... ." Id at 756.
173 Id. at 755. The court addressed the issue of the insurance agent's representa-
tions to Trahan by stating that under the Texas Insurance Code an insurance agent
does not have the power to alter the terms of the policy. See TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art.
21.04 (Vernon 1981). Thus, the court decided the case on issues of contractual in-
terpretation relevant to this comment.
174 Id at 756.
175 d at 754.




this raises the question of how the court determined the
insurance policy was ambiguous.1 7 9
The court acknowledged that had the policy been ini-
tially delivered with only the Partial Exclusion Aviation Risk
Rider attached, the meaning would not be ambiguous. 80
The court based its decision on the fact that the insurance
agent first tendered the policy with two aviation riders and
subsequently tendered it with one of them removed. 8 ' The
court seemed to be stretching to find an ambiguity, which is
important because it indicates that this case could have
been decided in favor of the defendant insurance company.
The court then dismissed former decisions8 2 and stated
that it could not find any decision on all fours with the case
at bar.8 3 The court continued by holding, that the absence
of a war risk clause had no legal effect and did not serve to
nullify the aviation exclusion rider.184 The court found ana-
lytical support only by arguing the negative. The court rea-
soned that even though the insurer could not use a war risk
exclusion to deny coverage (because there was not one in
the policy) it did not mean that it could not use the aviation
exclusion rider to deny coverage for war or military aviation
risks.' 85
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.' 86 also il-
lustrates the unpredictability of cases involving a life insur-
ance policy which excludes aviation risks but fails to
mention war risks where the insured dies while on a test
flight. In Wilmington Trust the insured purchased a life in-
surance policy that excluded "[d]eath as a result of operat-
ing or riding in any kind of aircraft, whether as a passenger
or otherwise, except [when] riding as a fare paying passen-
'7 Id. at 755.
1 8 Id. at 757.
181 Trahan, 289 S.W.2d at 757.
8 See Paradies v. Travelers Ins. Co., 52 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1944); see also
Durland v. New York Life Ins. Co., 61 N.Y.S.2d 700 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946).
1- Trahan, 289 S.W.2d at 757.
184 Id.
15 Id.
1- 177 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1949).
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ger in a licensed passenger aircraft .... 18 7 The policy also
included a provision which expressly stated that it con-
tained no restrictions relating to occupation.1 8a Finally, the
policy did not mention war risks or employment in the
military.
The insured subsequently gained employment with the
Army Air Corps Glider Program as a civilian assistant before
the policy was issued. He affirmatively answered the in-
surer's questions regarding his occupation as a pilot.
Shortly after the insurance company issued the policy, the
insured bailed out of a glider while piloting it on a test
flight and died when his parachute did not open. The in-
surer denied recovery under the policy, and the executor of
the insured filed suit.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the "no
restrictions on occupation" clause meant that the aviation
exclusion only applied to pleasure flights. 8 9 The court
found the policy unambiguous because it excluded cover-
age if the insured died as a result of operating or riding in
any kind of aircraft except as a fare-paying passenger.'90
The court felt the language of the insurance contract
clearly excluded this risk. 91
The court in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Daniels'92 cited
Wilmington Trust Co.' 93 in support of a similar decision for
the insurer.'94 In Daniels the insured, Daniels, purchased a
life insurance policy that excluded aviation risks unless the
insured was a fare-paying passenger. The policy did not
contain an exclusion for war or military risks. Daniels died
while piloting his military airplane, when it crashed as a re-
sult of engine failure.
187 Id. at 405.
188 Id.
- Id. at 409.
190 Id.
19, Wilmington Trust Co., 177 F.2d at 409.
'" 244 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1952).
19 177 F.2d at 404.
194 Daniels, 244 P.2d at 1068.
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The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the aviation
exclusion applied to more than just civilian aviation. 19 5 The
court reasoned that no specific provision or exclusion lim-
ited the policy coverage to civilian aviation. Just because
the policy failed to exclude military aviation explicitly did
not mean that the policy covered military aviation. 196 The
court basically held that the policy contained ambiguities
that the court construed against the drafter/insurance
company.
The cases involving casualties resulting from tactical ma-
neuvers, test flights, and training exemplify the courts' early
difficulties in interpreting life insurance policies. The
courts struggled with policies that contained aviation exclu-
sions but failed to contain provisions for military-related ac-
tivity. The courts faced the issue of determining whether
the death resulted from an uninsured aviation risk or a risk
associated with military service. The holdings reveal that it
was difficult to formulate a rule of law applicable to the dif-
fering fact scenarios and insurance policies.
c. Crashes Resulting from Mechanical Malfunction or
Severe Weather
A final line of cases, involving life insurance policies that
contained aviation exclusions but no war risk exclusions, re-
lates to casualties resulting from mechanical failure or se-
vere weather. In Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. 97
Green, the insured, purchased a life insurance policy which
contained an aviation exclusion, that excluded coverage for
"[d] eath occurring by reason of any aerial flight or journey
.. "198 unless the insured was a fare-paying passenger. Sub-
sequent to purchasing the insurance policy, Green enlisted
in the Navy and became a pilot. Thereafter, while on an
assignment in the Pacific, he crash-landed his plane in the
'9' Id. at 1067.
' Id. at 1067-68.
'9 144 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1944).
d. at 56.
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ocean because of severe weather. Green died of drowning
and exposure.
The First Circuit held that the policy excluded aviation
risks. 199 "The natural and obvious meaning of the aviation
clause in the case at bar is that the insurer declines to as-
sume those extra risks of death ordinarily associated with
aerial flight."20 0 The court also rejected the argument that
since the insurance policy failed to include a war risk exclu-
sion, death resulting from a war related aviation accident
should not be excluded.0
The court based its analysis on the argument that war risk
exclusions and aviation exclusions are to some extent over-
lapping.20 2 In Green's case the court believed the aviation
exclusion overlapped into war-related aviation risks and
thus recovery was barred.0 Finally, the court rejected the
argument that the aviation was not the proximate cause of
Green's death. The court held that when death is related
to the operation "of one of those popularly understood
risks" the issue of proximate causation is not an issue for
the court to decide.20 4
In Durland v. New York Life Insurance Co.20 5 the insured
died in a military aviation accident when his plane crashed
shortly after takeoff in the British West Indies. The in-
sured's life insurance policy contained a clause which stated
that the policy contained no conditions or exclusions re-
garding military service. A rubber stamped provision, how-
ever, followed this clause and stated that "[e]xcept as
,99 Id. at 57.
2 Id.
01 Green, 144 F.2d at 57. The court noted in dicta that if the insurance policy had
included a war risk exclusion, it would have excluded, "not only the risks of death
from participation in military aviation but also other multifarious risks attendant
upon military service ... in the air, or on the ground or under the sea." Id. See supra
note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that disagree with the
proposition that a war risk exclusion excludes coverage for military aviation.
= Id.
2w Id.
2 Id. In this case the court believed that Green's drowning in the water was indis-
putably associated with the risk of aerial travel. l
2-5 61 N.Y.S.2d 700 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946).
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provided by Aviation Rider Attached hereto.2 °6 The avia-
tion rider 2 7 was an exclusionary clause for aviation risks. 0 8
The beneficiary of the policy argued that the clause stat-
ing that the policy contained no military occupation condi-
tions indicated that the aviation rider only applied to
civilian flying. The court rejected the beneficiary's argu-
ment and granted the insurer's summary judgment motion
on the grounds that the policy was not ambiguous with re-
spect to the aviation exclusion.2°
The court reasoned that the rubber stamped imprint
which read "except as provided by the aviation rider" lim-
ited the "free from military service conditions" clause. 210 Ac-
cording to the court, the interpretation required the result
that while the policy, in general, covered military service
risks, the policy did not provide coverage for aviation risks
associated with military service. 11
Conaway v. Life Insurance Co.212 is probably one of the
most plaintiff-oriented decisions in this line of cases. In
Conaway the insured purchased a life insurance policy that
specifically excluded aviation risks unless the insured paid
for a ticket as a passenger .2 1 The policy also contained an
exclusion for war risks but only for the double indemnity
feature of the policy.21 4
The insured joined the Naval Reserve and became a
bomber pilot approximately a year and a half after purchas-
ing the policy. Conaway, flying a mission while on duty in
the Philippines, could not land his plane on his carrier be-
Id. at 701.
207 [A) rider is an attachment to an insurance policy that modifies the conditions
of the policy by expanding or restricting its benefits or excluding certain conditions
from coverage." BLACK'S LAW DICrioNAY 1323 (6th ed. 1990).
2 The clause excluded from coverage death as a direct or indirect result of rid-
ing in an aircraft, unless the insured was a "passenger." Durland, 61 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
- Id. at 703.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 76 N.E.2d 284 (Ohio 1947).
213 Insurance contracts define passengers who purchase tickets as "fare-paying pas-
sengers." Bryant, supra note 140, at 1278.
214 See supra text accompanying notes 133-40 for a discussion of double indemnity
features of life insurance policies.
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cause of a previous crash on the deck. Conaway died when
his plane ran out of fuel and crashed into the sea while he
was attempting to locate another U.S. carrier.
The insurer denied the beneficiary's recovery, claiming
that the aviation exclusion barred recovery. The Supreme
Court of Ohio disagreed and affirmed the appellate court's
decision in favor of the plaintiff beneficiary. 5 The court
held that the policy contained an ambiguity in regard to the
aviation exclusion. 16
The court explained that the double indemnity aspect of
the contract specifically excluded war risks but the aviation
exclusion located in the face value terms of the policy did
not mention war or military risk at all.217 The court ac-
cepted the inference that the insurance contract may or
may not have excluded military aviation from coverage and
construed this ambiguity against the drafter.2 1 8 The court
noted that if the insurer had intended to exclude war risks
in the general policy terms, it could have done so.219
Deaths resulting from an airplane's mechanical failure or
severe weather would appear to be aviation risks. The
courts in Green and-Durland support this proposition. The,
court in Conaway, however, did not find such reasoning per-
suasive. It is difficult to determine the rationale behind this
discrepancy. The holdings, while they do not offer much
guidance to the would-be litigant, illustrate the historical
struggle courts have interpreting insurance exclusions.
3. 'Fare-Paying Passenger"
In many of the cases discussed thus far, the aviation ex-
clusions have provided exceptions for fare-paying passen-
gers.22 0 The courts have addressed the question of whether
or not a member of the military is a "fare-paying passen-





22 See discussion supra part I.B.
638
WAR RISK EXCLUSIONS 9
ger." In Quinones v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. 22 1 the court
addressed this question. Quinones, the insured, served as a
military physician and was killed while flying as a passenger
on a military transport plane that crashed into a mountain.
The life insurance policy contained an exclusion that ex-
cluded coverage for death resulting from "operating, or rid-
ing in, any kind of aircraft, except as a fare-paying
passenger in a licensed passenger aircraft, operated by a li-
censed pilot in a regular passenger route between definitely
established airports .... 2 22
The Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected the insurer's
argument that the aviation exclusion precluded coverage
for Quinones because he did not satisfy the insurance pol-
icy's fare-paying passenger requirement.223 The Louisiana
Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's reasoning,
"[t] here is nothing in the aviation clause of this policy which
limits the coverage to Civilian as distinguished from Military
planes."224
The court then went on to hold that the airports satisfied
the insurance policy requirement of being "definitely estab-
lished."225 The flight routes also met the "regular passenger
route" policy requirement.2 26 Further, the court held that
the airplane satisfied the "licensed passenger aircraft" re-
quirement and that the pilot held a valid aviation license as
required by the policy.227
The court stated that it only had to decide whether Qui-
nones satisfied the "fare-paying passenger" element of the
contract.228 The court used judicial craftsmanship in its de-
cision in a manner that was anything but formalistic.
The Quinones court reasoned that the insured definitely
satisfied the passenger requirement, but in a narrow sense
22, 24 So. 2d 270 (La. 1945)..
n2 Id. at 271.
ns Id. at 272.
n4 Id.
5 Id,
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it could be said he did not pay his fare because he was rid-
ing on a pass.22' The court determined, however, that the
aviation insurance exclusionary clause contained nothing
which required that the insured pay his own fares.2 30 "A pas-
senger whose fare is paid directly or indirectly by his em-
ployer is certainly 'a fare paying passenger.' ,,2" The court
held that Quinones satisfied the "fare-paying passenger" re-
quirement within the meaning of the insurance policy and
that he should recover.23
2
A federal district court decided the issue of whether a ser-
vice member is a "fare-paying passenger" differently in
Burns v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.233 In Burns the in-
sured served as an army air corps flight officer who was trav-
eling as a passenger on a military plane on an authorized
flight when the plane exploded killing the insured and all
of the other passengers. The defendant insurance company
denied coverage on the ground that the insured did not
meet the "fare-paying passenger" condition as required by
the life insurance policy.2
34
The court agreed with the insurance company and held
that the insured did not qualify as a fare-paying passen-
ger.235 The court stated that "[a] fare-paying passenger is
one who pays the established legal rate of fare."236 The
29 Id. Since Quinones served in the military and flew on a military airplane the
army did not receive payment from him. The court recognized, but rejected, the
interpretation that Quinones paid no fare as required under the insurance contract.
Id.
2- Quinones, 24 So. 2d at 272.
231 Id.
232 Id.
- 79 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Mich. 1948), aff'd 179 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 947 (1950).
234 Id. at 849. The Policy read:
Death occurring by reason of any aerial flight or journey is not a risk
assumed by the Company .... If the insured at the time of such flight
shall be a fare-paying passenger in the course of transportation from
one definite terminal to another by means of an aerial conveyance in





Burns court's reasoning directly conflicted with Quinones37
in that the Burns court stated that "[t] he insured's transpor-
tation may have been an expense to the army, but that fact
did not make him a fare-paying passenger within the ordi-
nary and generally accepted meaning of that term as used
in the aviation clause of the policy."23 8
The Burns court even cited Quinones and called that
court's reasoning "far fetched" and stated that Burns obvi-
ously did not qualify as a fare-paying passenger because
Burns never paid for a ticket.239 The court continued to rea-
son that the ordinary meaning of "fare-paying passenger"
encompassed civilian commercial flights and not military
transport flights.2 40 The court stated that the ordinary
meaning of a fare-paying passenger related to civilian pas-
sengers purchasing tickets and traveling for civilian
purposes. 4'
Grimes v. New York Life Insurance Co.2 42 also raised the issue
of whether a passenger on a military aircraft satisfied a life
insurance policy's "fare-paying passenger" requirement.
Grimes, the insured, worked as a civilian engineer with
whom the government contracted to provide consulting
services. Grimes died while traveling as a passenger on a
military transport aircraft when it crashed into a hillside.
The defendant insurance company denied the benefici-
ary full recovery under the terms of the insurance policy
because of an aviation exclusion. The exclusion restricted
recovery to premiums paid if the insured died "as a result of
operating or riding in any kind of aircraft, whether as a pas-
senger or otherwise, other than as a fare-paying passenger
of a commercial airline. .24. The beneficiary brought suit
in federal district court and the defendant insurance com-
237 Quinones, 24 So. 2d at 272.
- Burns, 79 F. Supp. at 853.
- Id, at 853.
24 IM at 853-54.
241 Id.
242 84 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
24 ld. at 990.
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pany moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
insured was not a "fare-paying passenger."
The court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and held that a genuine issue of material fact ex-
isted as to whether the insured qualified as a fare-paying
passenger under the terms of the insurance contract.
244
The court cited Quinone 45 in support of its position that it
is possible for a person to satisfy the terms of the condition
by way of indirect payment of fare in the absence of a cash
transaction.246
The issue of whether a service member is a fare-paying
passenger has not been decided conclusively. Quinones v.
Life and Casualty Insurance Co.,2 47 Burns v. Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance Co. 248 , and Grimes v. New York Life Insurance Co.
2 49
are the leading cases in the area, but they are in conflict.
The holdings may be very fact-specific and depend on how
strictly a court interprets insurance contracts. No clear rea-
son, however, explains the courts' conflict. Like the other
cases in this area, the differing results indicate the courts'
early struggle with interpreting insurance exclusions in the
aviation context.
4. War Risks Exclusions and Hull Insurance?50
War risk exclusions have been examined in light of avia-
tion exclusions in the context of life insurance policies.
Hull insurance is another area where judicial interpretation
of war risk exclusions can be very significant. Aviation hull
insurance25 is coverage that "furnish[es] broad property
244 Id. at 991.
245 Quinones, 24 So. 2d at 270.
2 Grimes, 84 F. Supp. at 911.
-7 24 So. 2d 270 (La. 1945); see supra note 221 and accompanying text.
248 79 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Mich. 1948); see supra note 233 and accompanying text.
249 84 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1949); see supra note 242 and accompanying text.
-0 Hull insurance protects the aircraft owner's interests with coverage for damage
or loss to the plane or cargo. See supra text accompanying note 17.
25, See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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and physical damage coverage."2 52 This type of coverage is
often limited by war risk exclusions and other limitations.2 15
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.254 is the landmark case in the area of aviation exclusions
relating to hull insurance. Pan American had three types of
coverage including, (1) all risk insurance, (2) private war
risk insurance, and (3) a war risk insurance policy issued by
the United States Secretary of Transportation. 55 Two ter-
rorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine hijacked the Pan American airplane and destroyed it
with explosives.
The Aetna insurance policy contained a war risk exclu-
sion clause excluding losses from any military or usurped
power, or resulting from war, civil war, insurrection, warlike
operations, riots or civil commotions. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court decision that
a war risk exclusion does not bar recovery for terrorist hos-
tilities unless the policy explicitly excludes such activity. 256
It is significant that Pan American received insurance
coverage under the War Risk Insurance Act 25 7 because war
risk insurance is not offered by American insurers.258 Thus,
Pan American turned to the London market for its primary
coverage and then had to seek insurance from the United
States government for coverage above the London policy
limits. The United States paid Pan American between
$9,800,000 and $10,000,000 in insurance coverage.259
A war risk exclusion had a different result in Airlift Inter-
national, Inc. v. United States.2 ° In Airlift International the
plaintiff owned a civilian aircraft that operated under a gov-
ernment contract to transport cargo during the Vietnam
252 SPEISER, supra note 44, § 29:1, at 167.
252 1l
-.' 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
-5 War Risk Insurance Act, 49 USC §§ 1531-1542 (1958).
- Pam Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1022.
257 49 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1542 (1958); see infra note 268 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the War Risk Insurance Act.
- SPEISER, supra note 44, § 29:15, at 188.
25 Id.
260 335 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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War. The plane collided with another government aircraft
and the plaintiff's plane crashed to its total destruction.
The plaintiff had two insurance policies, one by a private
insurer which contained a war risk exclusion; the other in-
surance coverage came from the United States government
War Risk Insurance Act.2 61 The plaintiff sought recovery
under the United States policy.
The government's policy explicitly provided coverage for
the risks which private insurers excluded from the plain-
tiff's commercial aviation hull policy.262 The government
policy coverage included, "[1] oss or damage due to or result-
ing from: ... war ... or warlike operations, whether there
be a declaration of war or not . . .261 The court had to
decide whether the commercial insurance policy excluded
the war risk, thus triggering the governmental policy, or
whether the commercial policy did not exclude the risk re-
sulting in the private insurer's liability.
The court held that the commercial war risk exclusion
did not exclude the accident that resulted in the loss of the
plaintiff's aircraft. 21 The court reasoned that neither an
act of aggression nor an act of war caused the accident.2 65
The mid-air collision and subsequent loss resulted from a
peril of the air, not a peril or risk of war.2 66 This interpreta-
tion meant that the government policy did not provide cov-
erage for the accident because, according to the court, the
commercial policy assumed the risk for such an accident.
267
As can be seen from the previous cases, the courts' analy-
ses in the hull insurance cases are very similar to the life
insurance policy cases. War risk and aviation exclusion
often have an undetermined effect on the outcome of re-
covery. If a court determines the cause of the accident was
261 49 U.S.C. § 1531 (1990).
-6 The governmental insurance policy served to provide civilian air carriers insur-
ance for risks private insurers refused to insure. Id.
- Airlift Int'l Inc., 335 F. Supp. at 446.





an excluded risk, the aircraft owner's losses are uninsured.
The uncertainty appears to rest in the courts' difficulty in
determining which fact scenarios fall under an excluded
war risk. The implications of judicial interpretation and
construction are, to a certain degree, interconnected in
both life insurance and hull insurance cases. Thus, the con-
siderations of public policy, possible solutions, and critical
analysis are relevant to both types of cases.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. WAR RISK INSURANCE AND THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR
FLEET PROGRAM
The problem of interpreting and dealing with war risk
exclusions caused the United States government to enact
the War Risk Insurance Act268 as a subchapter to the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958.69 In the United States, war risk
insurance is completely a governmental endeavor, since
American insurance companies have avoided this market
and have solidified their position with the use of war risk
exclusions.270
The War Risk Insurance Act is a program that provides
insurance to air carriers "in situations where war risk insur-
ance is unavailable and the President has determined the
'the continuation of American Aircraft... is necessary to
carry out the foreign policy of the United States.' ",271 Insur-
ance can be issued for both premium insurance272 and non-
26 49 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1542 (1958).
269 SPEISER, supra note 44, § 29:15, at 187.
270 WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 14:19 (6th ed.
1990).
21 War Risk Insurance and the Civil Reserve Air Fkleet Program: Hearings Before the House
Subcomm. On Aviation of the Comm on Public Work and Trans., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. v
(1992) [hereinafter House Committee Report].
272 Premium insurance is available when the Secretary of Transportation deter-
mines that commercial insurance becomes extremely high or unavailable. This type
of insurance has been issued three time in our history: (1) for the Vietnam War, (2)
for the period close to the TWA hijacking, and (3) during the Gulf War against Iraq.
Id. at viii.
6451994-19951
646 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
premium insurance.7 3 The War Risk Insurance program is
limited, however, in that governmental insurance coverage
is only available for flights where both points are outside of
the United States or for flights between the United States
and a foreign point.2 7 4
The United States commercial air carrier industry wit-
nessed the success of the War Risk Insurance Act during the
Gulf War after Iraq invaded Kuwait.2 7 5 The Gulf War pro-
vided the largest civilian and military cooperative airlift in
history. 6 The commercial air fleet commissioned by the
government gave the largest, most extensive, most impres-
sive contribution of civilian aircraft to the military in sup-
port of military objectives that this country has ever seen.277
The War Risk Insurance program was critical to the success-
ful operation as it guaranteed .the aircraft owners protec-
tion from losses. 278
The importance of the War Risk Insurance Act is that it
provided the necessary insurance coverage for war risks that
United States insurers excluded from coverage.279 Without
the government insurance program it is likely that the civil-
ian and commercial airlines would have played a lesser
role. 28 0 This lesser role undoubtedly would have limited the
United States mobility during the Gulf War.28' Significantly,
the War Risk Insurance Act is a response to the confusion
of war risk exclusions because the government insures
those risks. The extra coverage decreases the likelihood of
litigation because a party suffering a loss will receive com-
pensation from either the government or a private insurer.
2- Non-premium insurance is available to aircraft called to participate in the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet Program (CRAF) which provides civilian planes to supplement
U.S. military air carrier capacity. Non-premium insurance can be issued to partici-
pating civilian carriers at the request of the Secretary of Defense. Id. at ix.
274 Id. at viii.
275 House Committee Report, supra note 271, at 1.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 4.
27 House Committee Report, supra note 271, at 4.
2 Id. at 6.
28, Id.
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Although the operation of the Act is limited to situations
determined to be in the interest of public policy, it has ef-
fected the interpretation of war risk exclusions. In Airlift In-
ternational, Inc. v. United States22 the court faced a situation
where the plaintiffs would recover no matter how the court
ruled because the government policy covered war risks and
the commercial policy covered all other risks.
Courts often prefer to decide cases in a manner that will
not result in forfeiture. a3 Some judges will, in extreme for-
feiture cases, explicitly argue that a result is too harsh and
will decide the case in a way that avoids forfeiture.2 84 These
decisions are usually driven by the notion that the, con-
tracting party should receive some benefit of his bargain.
However, courts are generally not this overt. Forfeiture is,
therefore, sometimes avoided by using arguments of waiver,
impossibility, or by construing the terms of the contract as
satisfied.285 The importance of forfeiture is that it may have
been an unstated driving force in the aviation cases ex-
amined thus far.
The significance of the War Risk Insurance Act's role is
that courts did not concern themselves with issues of total
loss or forfeiture in cases where an insured had both gov-
ernment and private insurance. Such concerns served no
purpose as the injured party had at least one form of recov-
ery, either under the War Risk Insurance program or
through private insurance. Although cases not involving the
War Risk Insurance Act rarely address issues of total loss
and received little or no mention in judicial analyses,2a one
has to wonder if the courts which ruled for the plaintiff/
beneficiary were result driven in their construction of the
22 335 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
-3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 8.4, at 362 (2d ed. 1990). Forfeiture
means a divestiture of money or property without compensation; it is a loss without
compensation. BLACK'S Law DICTIoNARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
- Professor Gregory Crespi, Lectures in Advanced Contracts, Southern Method-
ist University School of Law (Fall 1993).
585Id.
Professor Crespi explains that judges prefer to decide cases on grounds other
than forfeiture but believes issues of total loss often play a significant role in the
outcome of contract cases. Id.
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insurance policies. Although limited to relatively narrow sit-
uations, the interplay of the War Risk Insurance Act with
commercial policies may influence a more strict construc-
tion and interpretation of aviation insurance policies and
war risk exclusions.
B. AVIATION AND WAR RISK EXCLUSIONS IN LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES
Cases involving life insurance policies and controversies
over war and military risks are more difficult to understand
than the hull insurance cases. One of the problems is that
no clear guidance is given by the courts for interpreting
these types of exclusions.287 The only guidance the courts
have explicitly set forth are broad concepts of insurance law
and principles of the construction of contracts. 288 The guid-
ing principles are that ambiguities are construed against
the insurer, that the terms of the contract are given their
plain and ordinary meaning, that specific provisions are
given greater weight than general terms, and that typed or
hand written terms will prevail over boilerplate language. 9
The source of the general principles is contract law be-
cause insurance law is founded in contract.29 Understanda-
bly, contracts have different provisions and terminology,
and the lack of uniformity and precision is part of the prob-
lem.2' The great disparity between insurance policy lan-
guage and terminology has caused a great deal of judicial
confusion. 92
A single type of aviation coverage may contain dozens of
different policy variations and exclusions which are any-
thing but identical.2 9 In fact "the language varies widely
from policy to policy, and is often so ambiguous or compli-
cated that the insured-and even the courts-cannot de-
287 Hagglund & Arthur, supra note 88, at 6.
2 Id.
190 McGhee-Glisson, supra note 12, at 211.
"3 Miller, supra note 40, at 48.
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termine exactly what is excluded. " 29 4 Another source of
confusion is that judges approach cases differently in deter-
mining the meaning of an insurance contract and the ex-
pectations of the parties. 95 The result of such confusion, as
evidenced by the case law, is that the exclusion is not a ne-
gotiated part of the contract and only becomes an issue
when the insured receives a letter denying coverage. 96
Such letters usually result in litigation that is highly depen-
dent upon judicial interpretation.29 7
The judicial interpretation has been unpredictable be-
cause there are "no specific rules of construction which can
be applied in this area, but rather the cases have turned
largely upon the peculiar terms of phraseology of the policy
provisions in question and the unique factual situations in
each case."298 It would be a mistake, however, to assume
that this area is completely unpredictable because the draft-
ers of the policies can avoid complication through carefully
worded policies. Courts have seemed to focus on the cause
of the death or casualty.2 99
Although the opinions of the examined cases did not ex-
pressly discuss causation, it seemed to play a role in several
of the cases. This is true despite the rule recognized by a
majority of courts that no causal connection needs to exist
between the loss and the excluded risk for coverage to be
denied.30° Recall in Boye v. United Services Life Insurance Co. 0'
and Paradies v. Travelers Insurance Co.10 2 that the pilots were
-4 McGhee-Glisson, supra note 12, at 211.
2- E. ALLA FARNSWORTH, CorTmcTs § 7.7, at 238 (2d ed. 1990).
Judges are not of a single mind in approaching this task of determin-
ing the expectations of the parties. They differ in their faith in the
reliability of language and the inherent meaning of words. Judges also
differ in their tolerance of the inevitable protraction of the judicial
process that results from an abandonment of this faith.
Id.
- McGhee-Glisson, supra note 12, at 211.
Miller, supra note 40, at 48.
- Hagglund & Arthur, supra note 88, at 6.
- Simon, supra note 110, at 45.
-00 Hagglund & Arthur, supra note 88, at 45.
s' 168 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1948); see supra note 160 and accompanying text.
52 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1944); see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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killed when their aircraft was shot down. Their life policies
contained aviation exclusions but no war risk exclusions.
The courts found that the insureds' deaths resulted from
a risk of war and not from the risk of aviation. Thus, the
courts found it significant that their death was caused by en-
emy fire and not an aviation risk. Since hostile enemy activ-
ity was not an excluded risk, the beneficiaries of the life
insurance policies were allowed to recover. The courts
used a causation analysis to determine that the accident
arose out of a military risk, not from an excluded aviation
risk. Had the accidents resulted from a mechanical mal-
function the analysis would have been more difficult.
Using the causation analysis to understand the cases may
also explain the result of Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Insur-
ance Co., 30 3 where the enemy did not shoot the insured
down, but he died as a result of an aviation related mishap.
Again recall that the insured had an aviation exclusion but
no war risk exclusion. The court found that his crash land-
ing was a risk of an aviation type and therefore excluded
from coverage.3 °4 Using a causation analysis in this type of
situation is plausible.
The fact that a plane was shot down would seem to be
evidence that such an incident was a war risk. Unless war
risks are explicitly excluded from coverage, a fair interpre-
tation of a policy with an aviation exclusion is that such a
risk is not excluded. The reason is that there is no causal
link between the death and the excluded coverage. In con-
trast, in a situation where the military pilot crashed as a re-
sult of malfunctioning instruments, and the policy included
an aviation exclusion but no war risk exclusion, the causal
analysis would mean that the death was not covered be-
cause of the causal connection between the death and the
aviation exclusion.
Using a causation analysis to determine liability of the in-
surer seems like a reasonable approach to handling war risk
-' 144 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1944); see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
- Id. at 57.
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exclusions. Courts following this approach would probably
not hold as the court did in Conaway v. Life Insurance Co.,30 5
where the insured died when he crash landed his plane be-
cause he ran out of fuel. The insured's policy contained an
aviation exclusion but no war risk exclusion. °6 The court
held that the insured was covered under his insurance
policy.30 7
A causal analysis might mean that Conaway would come
out differently. The result would be different because Cona-
way's death had a causal connection to the aviation exclu-
sion. Running out of fuel would seem to be an aviation risk
and not a war risk. Although using a causation approach
might appear to be a reasonable solution, the outcome of
such cases may not change.
The possible explanation is that, when using a causal
analysis, the arguments focus on the causal link. The Cona-
way court could have easily reached the same result using a
causation approach merely by holding that running out of
fuel is causally connected to a war risk. Thus, because the
death was a result of war and war was not excluded from
coverage, the insured is provided coverage. The nature of
aviation exclusions is such that there is no easy solution and
the courts' holdings are still unpredictable.
Another possible solution to deal with the unpredictable
nature of aviation insurance policies and the judicial inter-
pretation of exclusions is the standardization of insurance
contracts. In fact, there has been some degree of standardi-
zation in the insurance industry in regard to war and mili-
tary risk aviation exclusions.30 After the Pan America
Airlines hijacking on September 6, 1970309 all risk insurers
- 76 N.E.2d 284 (Ohio 1947); see supra note 212 and accompanying text.
- Id. at 285.
-7 Id. at 286.
5 Miller, supra note 40, at 48.
- See supra note 253 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Pan American
Airlines hijacking.
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in the United States adopted the Common North American
Airline War Exclusion Clause (CWEC).310
As can be seen from the CWEC, this standardized provi-
sion describes the coverage from the insurer's perspective.
The apparent trend toward policies that expressly favor in-
surers is caused by the extreme vulnerability of insurers to
the judicial determination that policy terms are ambiguous.
Under the guise of ambiguity, judges with swift pens can
construe insurance policy provisions against the insurer.311
This type of standardization, however, is still subject tojudi-
cial construction and is unpredictable. 1
Litigation will likely follow despite the seemingly clear
terms of the insurance contract.313 "[T]he insured will ar-
gue (1) that he misunderstood what the coverage was, (2)
that the scope of the coverage was misrepresented to him
by the insurer or his agent, or (3) that the policy was not
written as requested by the insured."3 14 The outcome of
such arguments is equally unpredictable when the result de-
pends on ajury determination.3 15 It is difficult to tell how a
jury will decide when the common understanding of a life
insurance policy is that the insurer pays if the insured dies
an unexpected death.1 6
110 Vinciguerra, supra note 117, at 932. This standardized clause excludes cover-
age for losses resulting from:
(a) War, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities... civil war, re-
bellion, revolution or insurrection, military or usurped power... (b)
Any hostile detonation of any weapon of war employing atomic or nu-
clear fission and/or fusion ... (c) any unlawful seizure, diversion or
exercise of control of the aircraft, or attempt, threat, by force or threat
... (d) strikes, lockouts, labor disturbances, riots civil commotion. (e)
vandalism, sabotage, malicious act or other act intended to cause loss
or damage.
Id. at 932 n.61 (citing Comment, A Legal Response to Terrrist Hijacking and Insurance
Liability, 6 LAw & POL'Y Ir'L Bus. 1167, 1195 n.191 (1974)).
31, Miller, supra note 40, at 48.
312 Id.
313 Ballard & Chero, supra note 15, at 136.
314 Miller, supra note 40, at 49.
315 Interview with Larry Warren, Insurance Attorney at Ball & Weed, Inc., in San




Despite the unpredictability of jury decisions, standardi-
zation of aviation exclusions and policies will probably lead
to more predictable and trustworthy judicial decisions.1 7 At
the very least standardization would assist the insurance
companies and claimants in resolving difficult issues con-
cerning policy coverage and the intent of the parties."'
Standardization of insurance policies, however, is not free
of problems.
One problem with standardization that is frequently cited
is whether federal and state authorities would accept the
standardized policy because of concerns with antitrust viola-
tions.319 Insurance companies also may object because of
differing philosophies about how to underwrite aviation
risks.32 ° Insurance companies have also voiced the opinion
that they need to be free to tailor their policies to the needs
of their customers as well as the needs of the state. 2 Stand-
ardization may be one approach to dealing with the judicial
unpredictability, but it is not a solution that has received
unanimous support.
As long as aviation policies use vastly different language
to cover and exclude similar risks, judicial rulings will con-
tinue to differ.32 2 Today, aviation insurance policies and ex-
clusions are interpreted in isolation, and the courts do not
have much precedent to assist in the analysis.3 23 It is likely
that the insurers will adopt language that has been inter-
preted favorably by courts, and that the language resulting
in verdicts against the insurers will be dropped.3 24 It is possi-
ble that such adoption has been one of the reasons why
there have been relatively few recent cases involving war
3 Miller, supra note 40, at 50.
318 Id.
119 Id. The general concern is that standardized insurance policies would pose
unlawful restraints on trade and commerce. See, e.g., Paul W. Engstrom, Alternative
Wording to the Present General Aviation Insurance Policies, 43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 357, 358
n.5 (1977).
- Miller, supra note 40, at 50.
32 Id.
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risk and aviation exclusion clauses. But until the insurers
develop some sort of standardization, there may continue
to be a number of decisions that may surprise claim depart-
ments and underwriters for their liberty of construction.3 25
Commentators have argued that any standardization we
are seeing today "describes coverage more from the in-
sured's perspective than that of the insurer. That, in itself,
is significant progress as a matter of public policy in today's
era of consumerism."3 2 6
The writing of pro-consumer policies is questionable
since Other commentators have defined the role of the in-
surance companies in the aviation industry in a way that is
less pro-consumer.3 27 The insureds' position is that the in-
surance policy exclusions are plagued with confusion and
ambiguity.
The insurance companies and insurance attorneys, how-
ever, have been quite vocal in presenting their position.
The insurer's use of exclusions has been explained as hav-
ing an important role in aviation insurance policies.3 28 One
commentator noted that, "[c]ontrary to the belief of many
insureds and all plaintiffs' counsel, exclusions are not the
product of a collusive effort by underwriters and claim man-
agers to attempt to delete, in fine print, all coverage pro-
vided by insurance agreements under every set of facts that
could possibly result in a loss."329
The purposes of exclusions have been described as essen-
tial elements for ensuring that the premiums paid to the
insurance company are commensurate with the risks
against which the insurance company insures.3 3 0 "One basic
principle behind all liability policies is often overlooked.
These policies were not designed to compensate injured
'2 Id.
326 Miller, supra note 40, at 48.
327 See generally Ballard & Chero, supra note 15, for a discussion of business atti-
tudes and practices in the aviation insurance industry.




claimants. They were designed to indemnify the insured
but only within the risks contemplated."33 1
Since war and military risks are extremely unpredictable
and hazardous, the insurance companies argue that the ex-
clusions allow the insured to receive coverage at affordable
rates. 3 The argument continues that the exclusions allow
insureds to only pay for coverage of the risks for which they
seek insurance.333 Exclusions have also been defended on
the grounds that they help guard against overcompensation
by preventing multiple indemnification in cases where
there would otherwise be overlapping coverage in the same
policy or between different policies.334
This argument could reach a logical extreme as insur-
ance companies look to rewrite their aviation exclusion
clauses and standardize their aviation insurance policies.
Although such policies will arguably be cleaner, easier to
understand, and will probably eliminate a lot of problems,
the end result may be that no risk is covered.335 In fact, the
last clause of such a policy may read:
Notwithstanding any of the above provisions, it is hereby
agreed that due to the inadequacy of the premium charge,
no claims will be paid for any loss occurring under the
terms of this policy. However, in lieu thereof, upon notifica-
tion of any such loss, the underwriter will extend to the in-
sured his deepest sympathy.33 6
V. CONCLUSION
The rise of the airplane as a mode of transportation has
caused a certain degree of turmoil in the insurance industry
as well as in the courts. It is apparent from the cases ana-
lyzed that "no two jurisdictions, when interpreting the same
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or similar exclusion, will necessarily agree on its applica-
tion."3 37 The only thing that can be stated with certainty is
that each case stands on its own with its unique factual situ-
ation playing a vital role in the outcome. 8
Maybe this is not such a bad thing. "Perhaps each case
should stand on its own."33 9 Maybe judges should be free to
interpret each case in a manner that is somewhat unpre-
dictable. The problem with such an approach, however, is
twofold. First, uncertainty as to which accidents will be cov-
ered for the insurer translates into uncertainty for the in-
sured as well.34° Second, uncertainty of the risks that will be
covered means that the risk will be passed on to the insured
in the form of higher premiums.3 41 As long as no clear ex-
planation of the law exists, both the insurers and insureds
alike will continue to argue and litigate the interpretation
of aviation insurance exclusions in the context of military
or war time service.
337 Ballard & Chero, supra note 15, at 136.
"3 Id.
3" Id.
" Id.
341 Id
